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By Edward W. Cleary*
Preliminary Notes on Reading the
Rules of Evidencet
L INTRODUCTORY
Following a discussion of the then recently floated Preliminary
Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for Federal Courts, Chief
Judge Bailey Aldrich of the First Circuit Court of Appeals on May
21, 1969 wrote me:
Mr. Babcock reported to me the answer of yourself and Mr. Jenner to
my planted question why the rules make no express recognition of there
being what Mr. Jenner calls, "some play in the joints." With due respect,
it seems to me that there must be play as I look at my ten volumes of
Wigmore, and that you don't avoid the problem by not mentioning it.
It is now possible to amplify and illustrate in a meaningful way the
answer then given to Judge Aldrich.
The Preliminary Draft contained Rule 102, which remained un-
changed throughout the subsequent history of the Rules and was
so enacted by the Congress. It provides:
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration,
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth
and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be
ascertained and proceedings justly determined.1
Although captioned "Purpose and Construction," the rule in fact
furnishes small guidance in either respect. It does, however, indi-
cate one thing of importance: the answers to all questions that may
arise under the Rules may not be found in specific terms in the
Rules. This aspect will be considered in more detail at a later point.
The judgment that any more particularized approach not be at-
tempted was founded on several considerations. The enormous
variety of possible evidentiary situations, foreseeable and unfore-
seeable, posed obstacles to lesser generalizations. Encouragement
of creativity on the part of judges was guaranteed to arouse opposi-
* Professor Emeritus, University of Illinois and Arizona State University.
t Copyright 1978 by Edward W. Cleary. The style employed in text and foot-
notes is that of the author.
1. Neither the Model Code nor the Uniform Rules of 1953 contained provisions
dealing with purpose or construction.
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tion and reduce acceptability. Conflict and uncertainty with regard
to the application of the principles of Rule 402 (all relevant evi-
dence admissible except as otherwise provided), Rule 501 (no priv-
ileges except as provided), and Rule 601 (witnesses competent
except as provided), would be very likely. Therefore, the matter
should be left to general principles of statutory construction.
These comments, then, propose to explore the applicable prin-
ciples of construction and some cases illustrating their application
to the Rules of Evidence. 2 Possible'syntactical ambiguities 3 will
not be treated.
I1. BACKGROUND AND BASIC ASSUMPTIONS
The legal background against which the Rules were drafted and
enacted was a vast collection of common law precedents. True,
occasional jurisdictions had enacted codes, and some parts of evi-
dence law, e.g., privilege and competency of witnesses, were
largely statutory almost everywhere, but in the main the general-
ization held. This rather formless body of case law attracted much
faithful and perhaps uncritical adherence from among the legal
profession, partly because it had been evolved by the internal
processes of the legal profession itself, and partly because it com-
prised one of its familiar basic tools. Thus the Rules were working
old ground, and ground that was near and dear to much of the pro-
fession. By way of comparison, civil rights and antitrust involve
new ground, with no great accumulation of judge-made precedent,
and regulate the behavior of clients rather than lawyers and
judges.
While this background and its accompaniments were much in
evidence during the course of the formulation and enactment of
2. The term "Rules of Evidence" will be used herein to refer primarily to the
Federal Rules of Evidence. However, the comments will generally be appro-
priate for States adopting them or their substantial counterpart, the revised
Uniform Rules of 1974, with due regard for departures and variations.
3. See, for example, the "more or less probable" provision of Rule 401 in the
Preliminary Draft which was replaced by "more probable or less probable" in
later drafts. Note also Fed.R.Evid. 612 as-amended and enacted by the Con-
gress:
[I]f a witness uses a writing to refresh his memory for the purpose of
testifying, either-
(1) while testifying, or
(2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is
necessary in the interests of justice,
the adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced ....
Whether the grant of discretion applies only to item (1) or also to item (2)
may depend on whether the typesetter follows the above format, as in the
bill, or runs all into a solid paragraph in the interest of economy.
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the Rules, their impact on interpretation has perhaps been less
than might have been expected.
The most basic and fundamental assumption underlying the
Rules is that of congressional supremacy. "All legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States
... "4 The primacy of the Congress with regard to procedural
matters has never been seriously contested.
5
Scarcely less basic is the constitutional specification as to the
manner in which the Congress exercises its powers: bills must
pass both houses and receive the approval of the President, or pass
over his veto.6 The Congress may "work its will," to use the
quaintly ominous congressional phrase, only as so provided.
A further underlying assumption is that the Rules will operate
within the framework of an adversary system, with professional
lawyer representation of the parties as the norm.
7
II THE INSTRUMENTS OF INTERPRETATION
A. Intent or meaning?
An initial question is whether the interpretive inquiry is prop-
erly directed to ascertaining the intent of the legislature or the
meaning to its audience. Powerful arguments can be made in favor
of meaning to the audience. However, the audience for the Rules
of Evidence is a very specialized one of judges and lawyers, much
given to downgrading the text of statutes and looking elsewhere
for their meaning. Hence the saying in Washington, "You can
write the bill, if you let me write the report." As a result, intent
and meaning in this instance tend to come together, with meaning
being arrived at in terms of materials also relevant to intent.
Hence in the present setting, the terms intent and meaning can be
used inartfully and more or less interchangeably.
4. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 1.
5. For the history of congressional delegation of rulemaking power to, and its
acceptance and exercise by, the Supreme Court, see Proposed Rules of Evi-
dence: Hearings Before the Spec. Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Crim. Laws
of the House Comm on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1973) (State-
ment of Judge Albert B. Marls. See also Rules of Evidence (Supplement):
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1973) (Statement of Chief Justice Burger).
In the States, the pattern may, of course, vary, with the power vested either
in the legislature or in the supreme court.
6. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 7.
7. See, e.g. Rule 103 (admission and exclusion), obviously drawn in contempla-
tion of a measure of professional expertness on the part of those engaged
with its operations.
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B. The plain meaning rule.
The well known and perhaps equally well criticized case of
Caminetti v. United States gave voice to one oft quoted version of
the so-called "plain meaning" rule:
It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first in-
stance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is
plain, and if the law is within the constitutional authority of the law-mak-
ing body which passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it
according to its terms.
8
If what is meant is that meaning is to be ascertained by reading the
statute with the aid only of a dictionary and such aphorisms of con-
struction as noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis as may be suita-
ble, then it must be discarded as unrealistic. The slipperiness of
meaning combines with the ingenuity and resourcefulness of the
legal profession to render the evolution of a plain meaning by this
approach unlikely in any disputed situation, and if one should ap-
pear the chance is greatly against its being acceptable. 9
If, however, the plain meaning rule is read as mandating the
text of the statute as the prime source of meaning, to be read in
such context as may be relevant, then plain meaning becomes a
useful tool.'0
C. Purpose as context.
For most of the writers, it is said, legislative purpose is "the
touchstone of statutory interpretation."" Broadly, it overlaps leg-
islative intent, since legislative intent may be conceived of as im-
mediate purpose in contrast to legislative purpose viewed as a
more generalized long-term objective.12 In the present discussion
the distinction, though discernible, is not of substantial impor-
tance.
8. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). The Court ignored the
manifest purpose of the statute, namely to curb commercialized vice, and
sustained convictions under the Mann Act (transporting a woman in inter-
state commerce for purposes of prostitution or debauchery "or for any other
immoral purpose"), although no commercialized aspect was proved in any of
the combined cases, but only that the woman would be the concubine or mis-
tress of the particular defendant. Professor Kernochan raises the question
as to the result if a defendant had transported his girlfriend for purposes of
staging a bank holdup. Kernochan, Statutory Interpretation: An Outline of
Method, 3 Dalhousie L.J. 333 (1976).
9. Sands, Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46.02 (4th ed.
1973), hereafter cited as Sutherland.
10. Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes 229-233 (1975),
hereafter cited as Dickerson.
11. Id. at 87.
12. Id. at 87-88.
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The broad purposes sought to be achieved by the Rules of Evi-
dence are enumerated in the preparatory study, A Preliminary Re-
port on the Advisability and Feasibility of Developing Uniform
Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts, which ap-
peared in 1962.13 These purposes included uniformity, improve-
ment, and simplification. Save perhaps for uniformity, they offer
slight interpretive assistance. A statement of purpose also ap-
pears in Rule 102, but, as previously observed, contributes little to
the solution of particular problems of interpretation beyond the
important indication that all answers are not to be found in spe-
cific terms in the Rules. 14 Indicia of purpose do, however, appear
throughout the Rules as adjuncts to particular rules. These latter
indicia of purpose are sufficiently concrete and numerous to fur-
nish important assistance in approaching problems of interpreta-
tion.
D. Legislative history as context.
If the Congress can speak only as specified in the Constitution,
that is, by passing bills and obtaining the President's approval or
overriding his veto, then a plausible argument can be made that as
a matter of constitutional theory nothing said by the Congress in
any other way has any force as law and ought to be disregarded.
On policy grounds, the use of legislative history is criticized as in-
viting easy answers and drawing attention away from conveyed
meaning, purpose, and general scheme. 15 The British practice has
been against referring to legislative history at all. But in the United
States legislative history has proved irresistibly tempting, and it
must be admitted that, in exploring nuances of meaning, the rea-
soning and thought processes of those involved may be helpful as
a source of explication and illumination, without necessarily at-
tributing to them the authority of law.
The principal considerations in the use of legislative history are
its authoritativeness and its availability. Authoritativeness con-
cerns the extent to which given materials reflect the thinking that
actually went into the legislation. Availability is important for
very practical reasons. In the public interest, how far should the
profession and its menial diggers be expected, or even permitted,
to excavate and sift for minute shards of legislative history?
These two aspects will surface from time to time in the discussion
which follows, with the components of legislative history listed in a
13. 30 F.R.D. 73 (1962).
14. Text at n.1, supra.
15. Dickerson, ch. 10.
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roughly descending order of importance as measured in terms of
authoritativeness and availability.
1. The Rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. The Rules
prescribed by the Court constituted the official document trans-
mitted to the Congress. They carried the prestige of the Court,
both in its own right and as delegate of the congressional rulemak-
ing power under the various enabling acts. Moreover, they were
the basis of the bills introduced in the Congress. They are readily
available. 16
2. The Advisory Committee's Notes. The notes of the Advi-
sory Committee served the purposes of both supporting and ex-
plaining the Rules. They accompanied the Rules through the
successive stages of consideration by the Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure, the Judicial Conference of the United
States, and the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice transmitted
them to the Congress with the Rules.' 7 They were carefully scru-
tinized by the involved congressional committees and subcommit-
tees, and, except in those instances where superseding changes
were made in the Rules by the Congress, must be taken to repre-
sent the thinking of that body as the equivalent of a committee
report effectively serving as the basis of legislation. If the Con-
gress had not undertaken to review and in some instances to revise
the Rules, their significant legislative history would have included
no more than the 1962 Preliminary Report,18 the various drafts pro-
duced and circulated by the Advisory Committee, and the Advi-
sory Committee's Notes.19 All were widely reproduced and
16. See, e.g., 56 F.R.D. 187 (1973); 34 L. Ed. 2d lxvii (1973).
17. RULES OF EVIDENCE: COMMUNICATION FROM CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED
STATES, I Doc. No. 46, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
18. Supra, n. 12.
19. The original Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure included this
cautionary statement in its Notes:
Statements in the notes about the present state of the law, or the
extent to which existing statutes have been superseded by or incor-
porated in the rules, should be taken only as suggestions and guides
to source material Such statements, and any other statements in
the notes as to the purpose or effect of the rules, can have no greater
force than the reasons which may be adduced to support them. The
notes are not part of the rules, and the Supreme Court has not ap-
proved or otherwise assumed responsibility for them. They have no
official sanction, and can have no controlling weight with the courts,
when applying the rules in litigated cases.
H!R Doc. No. 588, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. vii (1938); 2 FED. R. SERV. 632 (1940).
Nevertheless, the profession and the judiciary eagerly sought the assistance
of the Notes; they were widely cited and quoted, and the statement proved to
be far too modest.
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publicized.20
3. Congressional materials. The materials emanating from
the Congress are of varying degrees of authority. Committee re-
ports include those of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the
House Judiciary Committee,2 1 the House Committee on the Judici-
ary,22 the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,2 3 and the Confer-
ence Report.24 All are helpful and highly authoritative.
Some materials in the Congressional Record are of authority
equivalent to a committee report, e.g., statements by the commit-
tee chairman, sponsor of the bill, or sponsor of an amendment.
Others are of lesser standing and may deserve little or no consider-
ation. While the credibility of the Congressional Record may in
some respects be dubious, no reason appears to doubt the accu-
racy of its account of the debates on the Rules.
At the instance of the Federal Judicial Center, relevant congres-
sional materials were assembled in conjunction with the Rules and
Advisory Committee's Notes, and the integrated product was made
available to all law book publishers.25
4. Remote materials. A large volume of materials falls below
the Plimsoll line both as to authoritativeness and availability.
Among them may be included.
Testimony, statements, and exhibits presented at congres-
sional committee hearings;
Proceedings at congressional committee "mark up" sessions;
Advisory Committee proceedings, tape recorded but not tran-
scribed,
Suggestions and comments received from organized bar
groups and other organizations and from individuals.
5. State resort to federal materials. The draftsmen of the re-
vised Uniform Rules and the various committees charged with ex-
amining the Federal Rules with a view to State adoption of course
20. See, e.g., 46 F.R.D. 163 (1969); 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971); 56 F.R.D. 183 (1973).
21. SuBcoMM. ON CRUMNAL JUSTCE, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JuDiciARY, H.R. 5463,
93d Cong., Ist Sess. (Comm. Print Oct. 10, 1973).
22. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7075.
23. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7051.
24. FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7098.
25. E.g., Federal Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates
with Notes by the Federal Judicial Center, Pertinent Advisory Committee
Notes and Relevant Legislative History (West 1975). These materials also
appear in the treatises.
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had access to the relevant federal legislative historical materials.
Hence it seems reasonable to assume that in the interpretation
process at the local level, subject to due regard for local notes, re-
sort to the federal materials is to be expected.26 The federal
materials are, however, one step further removed from the local
rules, and their impact may accordingly be somewhat diminished
in force, particularly where the text of the Rule itself may be
thought to be at variance with meaning as suggested by history.
IV. THE DEVELOPING PATERN OF INTERPRETATION
In principle, under the Federal Rules no common law of evi-
dence remains. "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided .... -27 In reality, of course, the body of com-
mon law knowledge continues to exist, though in the somewhat al-
tered form of a source of guidance in the exercise of delegated
powers.
In some instances the Rules contain explicit authorizations to
courts to occupy specified areas with judicial creations. One illus-
tration is the provision that privileges "shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." 28
Another will be found in the open end hearsay exceptions admit-
ting hearsay statements not specifically enumerated but "having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, ..."29
subject to compliance with specified restrictions. Congressional
entrustment of discretion to the judges in dealing with privilege is
far broader in terms than with uncharted hearsay, yet the reported
decisions dealing with the latter are far more numerous. 30
A considerably different pattern is that of a general rule fol-
lowed by specific applications. Thus the broad principle that the
admissibility of relevant evidence is subject to the limitations of
" prejudice"31 is followed by a series of rules consisting of concrete
26. Dickerson 159.
27. Fed.R.Evid. 402. See United States v. Grajeda, 570 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1978).
28. Fed.R.Evid. 501. Except for the communications privileges, Wigmore made
no effort to distill out any general principles governing the common law of
privilege, and none is apparent. Wigmore, Evidence § 2285' (McNaughton
Rev.). In view of this lack, plus the fact that virtually the entire law of privi-
lege today is statutory, the Rule offers slight guidance. It is worth noting that
in Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933), where the quoted language of
the Rule finds its genesis, State legislation on the marital privileges fur-
nished the stimulus for departing from common law concepts of incompe-
tency.
29. Fed.R.Evid. 803(24), 804(b) (5).
30. Much too numerous to be treated in this discussion.
31. FedJ.Evid. 401-403.
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applications in connection with character,32 compromise, 33 liability
insurance,34 and so on. That the rules with concrete applications
are not intended to be a complete catalog of situations where the
general principles apply must be self-evident;3 5 otherwise the
statement of the general governing principles would be quite need-
less. Moreover, the relevancy/prejudice relationship finds expres-
sion in other rules, e.g., those dealing with character and conduct
of witnesses6 and with impeachment by conviction.3 7 The com-
mon law experience will, then, suggest additional applications, e.g.,
contradiction on collateral matters for impeachment purposes,
speculative and conjectural evidence, or purportedly scientific evi-
dence in an insufficiently established field.
With regard to the more particularized rules, the question
arises as to the proper treatment of parallel situations. Should the
Rule be regarded as an exclusive occupancy of the area or as a
basis for extension by analogy? The answer lies in the purpose of
the Rule. An illustration is found in United States v. Lewis,3 8
where a witness made an out-of-court identification statement of
the accused after viewing his photograph. Was the statement
hearsay when offered at the trial? Rule 801(d) (1) (C) removes
from the category of hearsay a prior statement made by a witness
who is available for cross-examination at the trial if the statement
is "one of identification of a person after perceiving him .... "
The language clearly contemplates seeing the individual in person.
Yet the court pointed to the reason for the Rule, namely the unreli-
ability of courtroom identification because of lapse of time and the
suggestiveness of the circumstances, and decided that the state-
ment fell within the Rule and was admissible. A further illustra-
tion is found in Kennedy v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,39 a slip
and fall case. The presiding judge's clerk, known to the jury to be
such, testified that he visited the locus after a heavy rain and saw a
pool of water there. A reversal resulted. The court relied in part
on Rule 605 which renders the judge incompetent to be a witness
in the trial over which he is presiding. The court thought the rea-
sons for the Rule applied to the judge's clerk, quoting the Advisory
Committee's Note:
32. Fed.R.Evid. 404.
33. Fed.R.Evid. 408.
34. Fed.R.Evid. 411.
35. See also Advisory Committee's Note, Fed.R.Evid. 401. For convenient
sources, see note 25 supra.
36. Fed.R.Evid. 608.
37. Fed.R.Evid. 609.
38. 565 F.2d 1248 (2d Cir. 1977).
39. 551 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1977).
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The solution here presented is a broad rule of incompetency, rather
than such alternatives as incompetency only as to material matters, leav-
ing the matter to the discretion of the judge, or recognizing no incompe-
tency. The choice is the result of inability to evolve satisfactory answers to
questions which arise when the judge abandons the bench for the witness
stand. Who rules on objections? Who compels him to answer? Can he
rule impartially on the weight and admissibility of his own testimony?
Can he be impeached or cross-examined effectively? Can he, in a jury
trial, avoid conferring his seal of approval on one side in the eyes of the
jury? Can he, in a bench trial, avoid an involvement destructive of impar-
tiality? The rule of general incompetency has substantial support. (Cita-
tions omitted). (Emphasis supplied).4°
Both of the foregoing cases are completely acceptable exten-
sions by analogy within the purpose of a rule. In contrast is the
amendment of a rule by engrafting a further requirement. An ex-
ample is the Fifth Circuit decision of United States v. Beechum.4 1
The case involved Rule 404(b), which mandates exclusion of evi-
dence of other crimes as proof of character in order to suggest the
inference that the person acted in conformity with that character,
but does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for
other purposes, including proof of intent. The court decided to
continue the former rule of the circuit which required that other
crimes in intent cases be proved by clear and convincing evidence,
although no such requirement is found in Rule 404(b). "As a codi-
fication founded on its historical antecedents, the Federal Rules of
Evidence shall not be taken to repeal the products of our studied
deliberation unless that intention is clearly manifest."42 The re-
sult was to frustrate application of the Rule, to destroy uniformity
of interpretation, and to violate the accepted principles of statutory
construction. Other Fifth Circuit decisions do not, however, bear
out the declared purpose of maintaining an evidentiary subculture
in that part of the judicial system of the United States.
Familiar doctrine requires that statutes be read as a whole.4 3
Similarly as to the Rules, which must not be read separately and in
isolation but as a part of an entire system, with due regard to its
plan and organization and to the contents of rules other than the
particular one under consideration. And so with United States v.
Batts,44 a narcotics prosecution in which defendant denied know-
ing that the hashish in question was hidden in his vehicle. On
cross-examination, without objection, he denied knowing the na-
ture of a "coke" spoon that he was wearing on a necklace when
40. 551 F.2d at 597.
41. 555 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1977).
42. 555 F.2d at 509. The principle that statutes in derogation of the common law
are to be donstrued strictly is generally discredited. Dickerson 206-208.
43. Sutherland § 46.05.
44. 558 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1977).
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arrested. In rebuttal the government introduced evidence of prior
possession and offer for sale of cocaine by defendant, that had
been suppressed because of unlawful seizure. On appeal, defend-
ant claimed a violation of Rule 608(b), which states that specific
instances of conduct to attack the credibility of a witness are not
provable by specific instances, although they may be inquired into
on cross-examination concerning the character of the witness for
truthfulness. The court might have disposed of this contention by
pointing out that Rule 608(b) deals with evidence bearing on
character for truthfulness, leaving evidence bearing directly on
the question whether the witness was telling the truth in this par-
ticular case to be governed by general principles of relevancy. In-
stead, the court invoked Rule 404(b), which allows evidence of
other crimes for the purpose of proving knowledge or absence of
mistake or accident. In such event, the court pointed out, Rule
608(b) does not act to bar the evidence.
Reading the Rules as a whole would obviate much of the diffi-
culty which traditionally has attended and continues to attend the
introduction into evidence of declarations of a coconspirator. In
United States v. Petrozziello,45 the Court of Appeals of the First
Circuit inquired into the impact of the Rules upon its former rule,
which had been to admit if there was enough independent
nonhearsay evidence to make a prima facie case. The court con-
cluded that Rule 104(a) committed the preliminary question en-
tirely to the determination of the judge, with the incidental effect
of rendering the rules of evidence, except the privilege rule, inap-
plicable to the preliminary fact determination. The court failed to
observe that Rule 801(d) (2) (E) classes coconspirators' declara-
tions with admissions and removes them from the category of
hearsay. Hence the preliminary question is not one of administer-
ing a technical rule of exclusion, namely the rule against hearsay,
but rather one of simply determining the occurrence of certain fac-
tual conditions on which relevancy, in the broad sense, depends.
The treatment would correspond with that accorded admissions by
an agent: Was the agent "authorized?" Did he make the state-
ment? These are questions under Rule 104(b), a conclusion which
would incidentally relieve the court of its concerns over the inap-
plicability of the Rules to the process of determining the prelimi-
nary question. The First Circuit should have stayed with its
earlier rule, as consistent with the Federal Rules.
On occasion collisions may occur between legislative history
and the seemingly unmistakable meaning of a Rule. This has hap-
pened in the case of crimes involving "dishonesty or false state-
45. 548 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1977).
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ment," under Rule 609(a). Important consequences attach to the
determination whether a crime falls within this category. If it
does, then a conviction of it may be used to impeach any witness
without regard to whether it is of felony grade, and the weighing of
probative value against prejudice to a defendant is not required.
United States v. Smith,'4 reached what is on its face a remarkable
result: attempted burglary involves neither dishonesty nor false
statement. Lewis Carroll would have been pleased. None would
question the result with regard to false statement, but few could be
found who would not agree that robbery or any other form of theft
is dishonest. Yet considering the legislative history, which the
court examined carefully and in detail, the conclusion that the
Congress intended to include only crimes of false statement, and
that "dishonesty" was devoid of significant meaning, is difficult to
avoid. Illustrative of the legislative history is the Conference
Committee Report:
By the phrase "dishonesty and false statement" the Conference means
crimes such as perjury or subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal
fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense, or any other offense in the nature
of crimen falsi, the commission of which involves some element of deceit,
untruthfulness or falsification bearing on the accused's propensity to tes-
tify truthfully.
47
One may question whether the same result will be reached in
States adopting Rule 609(a), in view of the almost certain attenua-
tion in some degree of the impact of federal legislative history at
the State level.
CONCLUSION
The passage of a number of years and the decision of a variety
of cases have been the requisites to the formulation of a satisfying
answer to Judge Aldrich's question. That answer is that the ac-
cepted rules of statutory interpretation are in general being ap-
plied by the courts to the Rules with skill and thought, adapting
the Rules where necessary and appropriate in a manner consistent
with the purposes sought to be achieved.
46. 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
47. FEDERAL RuLEs oF EVIDENCE, H.P. CoNF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9
(1974) (quoted by the court in 551 F.2d at 362). Accord, United States v.
Seamster, 568 F.2d 188 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827,846
(7th Cir. 1977). Contra, United States v. Carden, 529 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1976)
(very abbreviated treatment).
